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Abstract 
At the request of the Dutch government Shell has been preparing for a possible CO2 storage project in the town of 
Barendrecht since 2007. The project involves transport and storage of pure CO2 produced at the Shell Pernis refinery 
(a by-product from hydrogen production) through 20 km of pipeline and into two depleted gas fields. Because this is 
a densely populated area public acceptance was recognised from the start as the key challenge for the project. This 
paper will describe the key elements of a comprehensive public acceptance strategy, and also a frank analysis of 
what went well and what didn’t go well on the Barendrecht project.  
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1. Introduction 
It is important to be aware that many CCS projects at the moment are the result of a public tender process in 
which government agencies select projects that they want to support financially. The whole ‘design’ of the project  
is influenced and decided on not only by the company executing the project but also very strongly by the authorities 
who define the tender specification, selection criteria, and ultimately select the projects that get funding and 
therefore go ahead. This paper will focus on public acceptance from a company’s perspective. One of the key 
learnings from the Barendrecht project is that in case of publicly co-funded projects it is essential that the authorities 
and the companies involved work together very closely from the start in developing a public acceptance strategy.  
Where this is particularly relevant it will be noted in this paper.    
The set-up of this paper is fairly generic and therefore applicable to CCS projects in general. However, because 
of the specific characteristics of the Barendrecht project the emphasis and most learnings will be on the transport 
and storage part of the CCS chain, on the early phases of a project, on external acceptance (although acceptance 
within the company can also be a challenge and should not be forgotten) and on local acceptance from the direct 
neighbors of the project. Local acceptance cannot be addressed in isolation of broader, often political issues. In the 
Netherlands opinions on the need for CCS are still hotly debated within and between different organizations like 
political parties, knowledge institutes and NGO’s. As a result there are many stakeholders with an interest in the 
success or failure of demonstration projects.     
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This paper will describe the main steps in developing a comprehensive public acceptance strategy: 
• Understanding the Playing Field:  this is basically the outside environment in which the project will be 
realized; it needs to be thoroughly understood to be able to set up an effective public acceptance and 
communication plan; it defines the level of readiness and support of the key stakeholders for CCS in 
general and for the project in specific. 
• Defining the Local Value Proposition: a comprehensive inventarisation and assessment of all the pro’s 
and con’s of the project from a local stakeholder and neighbor’s perspective. 
• When the playing field and the local value proposition are understood, sufficient information is available 
to set up a Public Acceptance Strategy; typically this should include activities to improve the playing 
field, to improve the local value proposition, and to effectively communicate and engage with 
stakeholders. 
Finally, it is important to note that the recommended steps as described in this paper were not always followed 
for the Barendrecht project – the project was and is a pathfinder and one of its objectives is to learn. Various ‘after-
action’ reviews have been done on the communication around the Barendrecht project and the conclusions on the 
main lessons to be learnt have been reflected in this paper.    
2. The Playing Field 
Figure 1 shows the key elements of the playing field that need to be understood in order to define an effective 
public acceptance strategy. Below, the importance for public acceptance of each of these elements is described and 
some comments are made on the Barendrecht situation.  
 
 
Figure 1 The Playing Field 
A general comment that is relevant for all elements is that the Barendrecht project was started in 2006 and 
communication with local stakeholders in 2007. Awareness of climate change was relatively high due to the “Al 
Gore – Inconvenient Truth” impact, and there was energy and money to commence new projects. Four years later 
we have had ‘Climate Gate’ scandals, an economic crisis and the Dutch government has fallen.  
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These external developments will always happen. Therefore any description of the playing field will by definition be 
a snapshot in time, and will require regular updating. 
a. Climate change and energy security: a general understanding and acceptance is required that with current 
practices we risk serious problems due to climate change and/or the security of energy supply. People who do 
not accept this will not support spending (public) money on CCS projects.   
Barendrecht: in general people in The Netherlands are aware of the issue of climate change and are starting to 
understand the link to the issue of energy security. However, surveys also show that the Dutch are among the 
most skeptical people in the EU and most inclined to think that the problem (climate change) is being 
exaggerated. More recently the economic crisis has given people an incentive, and the climate-gate scandals an 
excuse to become less concerned about climate change. 
b. The need for and benefits of CCS: in Shell we think that all options should be considered and developed in 
order to address the issues of climate change and energy security, so: energy efficiency AND renewable energy 
AND CCS. People who do not think CCS is needed or who do not think CCS will be effective will not be 
supportive of demo-projects. This is the position of some NGO’s and also some political parties. 
Barendrecht: several system-studies had been published showing that the most cost-effective way to meet 
challenging CO2-reduction targets would be a combination of different measures, including CCS. Experts in the 
relevant ministries, knowledge institutes, political parties, universities and companies all seemed to agree. 
However, this consensus turned out to be rather superficial. At the first signs of local resistance opinions 
started to diverge. In retrospect this is not difficult to explain as both the width and depth of discussions before 
2007 were in general quite limited: 
-  very few people were involved in discussions around the need for CCS before 2006; for example, there was 
only one person involved at national level (Ministries) at the time the original tender for storage demo-projects 
was issued in 2007.  
- discussions before 2007 tended to be fairly academic and high-level; as soon as the discussion moved from 
general issues to a specific storage location this changed. Many people started thinking seriously about CCS 
for the first time. Media started giving attention to the topic. Local resistance and lobby activities caused a re-
think with those already involved. 
c. Sufficient knowledge and experience: in order to start industrial scale demonstration projects there needs to be 
consensus that the key players involved have sufficient knowledge and experience to execute such a project 
safely. This is a very important but difficult issue from a communications perspective. CCS is a new 
development, so by definition there will be ‘new’ aspects to a demo-project. For opponents anything ‘new’ is 
also quickly something uncertain and risky. People who do not think there is sufficient knowledge or experience 
yet will not be supportive of onshore demo-projects and will prefer further laboratory work and/or very small 
scale testing.  
Barendrecht: in the Netherlands the expert community is connected through the CATO programme. In this 
community there was fairly broad consensus that, from a technical and safety perspective, there was enough 
research done and practical experience available (with CO2-EOR, gas storage and CO2 transport) to move to 
industrial scale demo-projects. Nevertheless, the general public’s impression over the last few years is probably 
that the scientific community is divided on this issue. This unfavorable picture could develop for three reasons: 
- critical scientists are not difficult to find for a controversial issue like CO2 storage. Several of these scientists 
were even willing to criticize aspects of the project which were not part of their actual area of expertise. 
- the scientific community in CATO has traditionally been quite reluctant to get involved in public discussions 
on CCS as these discussions sometimes have a political angle and/or commercial interests are involved. This is 
now slowly changing with CATO getting more involved with communication activities and sharing knowledge. 
- media stories (about local concerns) benefitted in general more from interviewing or quoting scientists that 
claimed the project was risky than those who said it was safe.       
d. The maturity of the existing legal and commercial frameworks: local stakeholders are more likely to accept a 
new activity if current legislation and regulations are adequate for making sure the activity does not threaten 
their safety and that damage compensation laws will cover any 3rd party damage. Examples of relevant 
regulations for CCS activities include guidelines for external safety calculations for CO2 leaks, containment 
demonstration guidelines, monitoring requirements, financial securities requirements, long-term storage 
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management requirements.  When these regulations are not clear yet this creates uncertainties for the companies 
carrying out the project but also for the local stakeholders.   
Barendrecht: when the Barendrecht project started the framework was in principle sufficiently developed: the 
Dutch mining law did cater already for the possibility of CO2 storage, the AMESCO study had defined the 
requirements for an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for storage, and external safety regulations for 
hazardous installations could also be used for CO2 transport and storage (voluntarily). On the other hand, none 
of these regulations had CO2 storage in mind when developed and therefore were often ‘not blocking’ CCS 
rather than actively regulating it. Many of the missing elements are currently being addressed in the 
implementation of the EU CCS directive and also in the new Dutch requirements for pipelines and external 
safety. In the meantime Shell used their own standards in developing the design and monitoring plan for this 
project. adopting a conservative approach in order to always err on the safe side. Nevertheless, self-imposed 
standards by large companies, even when more stringent, always create less confidence with stakeholders than 
government imposed standards.      
e. Small demonstration projects: for various reasons it is good practice to scale up project size gradually so that 
confidence can be gained at an acceptable level of risk (technical, commercial, reputation). For the same reason 
it is also good to do tests with uncertain outcomes (e.g. CO2 storage in shallow aquifers) further away from 
populated areas and only move to more populated areas when there is sufficient confidence in safe and 
permanent storage.   
Barendrecht: the Dutch government had made available relatively small subsidies for a number of small scale 
capture and storage demo’s. As there was already a successful offshore demo-project (K12) and as half of the 
Dutch storage capacity is onshore it was decided that the next demo-projects should be onshore. Shell further 
decided that both from a learning perspective and from a public acceptance perspective it would be very good 
to start with a very small field (the first Barendrecht field will be ‘full’ in 3 years). It will allow an early test of 
regulations for field-abandonment, post-abandonment monitoring and hand-over procedures to the authorities 
for long-term monitoring. The latter is important for commercial reasons but also for public acceptance 
reasons; neighbors want to know more in detail what happens after the field has been filled up. Unfortunately, 
hardly anyone in the Netherlands knew about the existing offshore project, nor about other operational projects 
worldwide or about the 30+ years (and thousands of injection wells) of experience with CO2-injection in North 
America. This made it easy for opponents of the project to paint a picture of a complete new and risky technique 
being tested for the very first time right under a densely populated area. The word ‘experiment’ was used 
repeatedly. This, in combination with the seemingly divided scientific community (see c), made it difficult to get 
acceptance for the message that the techniques that were going to be used were all safe and proven. 
f. Large scale demonstration projects: small scale demonstration projects are done to prepare the way for larger 
scale demo-projects. Public acceptance for these small scale demo’s will therefore also depend on the public 
acceptance for the projects that will follow. This links closely to the discussion under a, b and c. In general it 
means that people need to understand the need for large scale deployment of CCS. 
Barendrecht: the Barendrecht project will store pure CO2 from an existing hydrogen plant at the Pernis 
refinery. As such it was not that controversial and several NGO’s were quite positive about this project in 
initial conversations.  At the start of the project we therefore had hope that some of these NGO’s would be 
willing to help us in the public debate. However, with 4 to 6 new coal-fired power plants planned in the 
Netherlands, it became clear fairly quickly that the Barendrecht project could also be seen as a potential 
enabler for these coal-fired power plants as they depended on the promise of future CO2 capture and storage. 
In our experience it has been the opponents of CCS in general and of coal power plants that have been the most 
vocal in their opposition to the Barendrecht project. The project delays this has caused are used by opponents 
of CCS as evidence that CCS will not be able to deliver the necessary reductions in emissions on time. 
g. Local politics and issues: it goes without saying that it is very important to understand what is going on in a 
local community when you want to start a new project there. Important information includes a.o. demographic 
data, presence (or not) of comparable activities, political color of local authorities, the popularity (or not) of 
local council, aldermen and mayor, key issues on the local agenda, recent history of local resistance against new 
plans or activities, and much more.  
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Barendrecht: although the people of Barendrecht are used to live next door to an industrial activity like gas 
production and treatment, it quickly became clear that not many people are actually aware that they are also 
living above a natural gas reservoir. Nevertheless, this did help in communicating the relative impacts and risks 
of CO2-storage facilities (more or less the same as for gas production facilities). Gas production has peacefully 
co-existed with housing estates for over 10 years now. The population of Barendrecht is relatively young; many 
young families moved to new housing areas in the last 5 years or so. These families are concerned about the 
value of their property (which has already declined because of the economic crisis). It also became clear that 
Barendrecht had a history w.r.t. recent infrastructure projects of regional or national importance and the 
prevailing local view was that Barendrecht had done enough for projects of ‘national importance’ in recent 
years and therefore shouldn’t  host yet another activity with few if any local benefits. See also Section 3 (Local 
value proposition). The timing of the local elections (early 2010) was also such that the local representatives of 
all political parties (even those that were in favor) voted against the project because of the lack of local 
support.  
h. People in key positions: because of the controversy these projects can create they are likely to end up on the 
desks of people in influential positions in the organizations involved in the decision making processes. It is 
important to fully understand what these people know about CCS, where they stand on the issue, what their 
main drivers and interests are, and who they listen to for advice.   
Barendrecht: for the Barendrecht project a key challenge has been that many of the people in key positions 
were not very familiar yet with CCS in general and with the issues and concerns around geological storage in 
specific. It also took some time before the national authorities were ready to pick up their role in the 
communication process, communicating the need for CCS in general and the need for an early onshore project 
like Barendrecht in specific. It was only in 2008 that the current governmental CCS project organization was 
started. The Barendrecht project has nevertheless benefited from the support of people in key positions: CCS is 
warmly supported in the Rotterdam region in the Rotterdam Climate Initiative, and the previous government 
firmly believed that the Netherlands were uniquely positioned to take a leading role on CCS. It also became 
clear that as the political heat around the project increased several people no longer supported the project and 
some even turned against it.  
 
A thorough assessment of the playing field, as described above, is essential to identify any areas that need 
strengthening before (or in parallel with) the start of a project. See also Section 4. With the benefits of hindsight 
below some of the key lessons learnt are summarised: 
• Do not mistake a lack of debate for consensus; a real debate is only likely to start after specific onshore 
locations are named as potential storage sites; that will trigger local debate, and that will create the need for 
politicians to (re-)think about their position on CCS. 
• Invite a scientific panel or sounding board in an early stage to comment on proposals and to engage with the 
public. Anticipate however, that opponents will always find scientists that will support them. 
• Be clear to the authorities in an early stage on which regulations need to be in place before a project can start. 
And think twice about starting a project before this is actually in place. 
• Make an honest assessment of which government departments, agencies, advisory bodies, you will need to 
progress the project, and of their current capacity (knowledge, experience, resources) to deal with a CCS 
project. And think twice about starting a project when capacity is lacking (depending on the size of the 
investment involved).  
• Opponents of CCS will try to label any demo-project as a ‘dangerous experiment’; from the start therefore there 
needs to be clear, consistent and repeated messaging on what is, and what is not being tested in the 
demonstration project.  
• Explain and emphasize the importance of CCS for energy-intensive industries and for creating ‘negative’ 
emissions (in combination with biofuels). 
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3. The Local Value Proposition 
After assessing the external environment and level of readiness it is important to have a closer look at the project 
itself and what it would bring to the local community. As mentioned before this paper will focus on the local 
stakeholders for the transport and storage elements of the CCS chain. Often the capture location will be too far away 
from the storage location to be of interest for the local community. This is an inherent weakness and challenge for 
CCS projects. The capture part of the chain will often generate significant activity and employment, and therefore 
local benefits. However, the storage part of the chain creates very little local employment or other benefits and is 
also perceived to have the most risk. The conclusion for onshore storage projects therefore is that it will often be a 
challenge to set up the project in such a way that the benefits, risks and impacts, as perceived by the local 
stakeholders are fairly distributed.  The term Local Value Proposition aims to capture all the pro’s and con’s for the 
local stakeholders. Figure 2 shows the key elements of the Local Value Proposition. They will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
 
Figure 2 Local Value Proposition 
a. National (global) benefits: the main argument for CCS comes from long-term scenario analyses which show 
that without CCS it will be much more difficult and expensive to achieve the necessary reductions in CO2 
emissions. These scenario’s also show that CCS is most important for those countries that have large coal 
reserves. Explaining this to local neighbors of a storage project is challenging. Most people have heard of 
climate change and that CO2-emissions are to blame, and they do realize action is needed. However, we found 
that this does not necessarily mean they will support a storage project. People who are really concerned about 
climate change and want to do something typically prefer other solutions (wind mills, solar panels) and do not 
support more coal power plants. The negative connotations associated with CO2 as a result of the climate debate 
has resulted in many people thinking of CO2 as serious, even toxic, pollution and therefore not something you 
want in your village. It is therefore important that the national authorities are active at an early stage in 
communicating why these projects are needed and what the broader and more long-term benefits will be. 
Ideally this should be through a broad public information and engagement campaign before location specific 
projects are started. Awareness raising is a long process however. For the first generation of projects it is very 
likely that the national/global importance of CCS projects will hardly play a direct role in the Local Value 
Proposition. People will look primarily at the local pro’s and con’s. 
b. Local benefits: local benefits should include everything that is a direct or indirect benefit resulting from the 
execution of the project. As mentioned above, for neighbors of the storage project (or of a pipeline) the benefits 
from the capture part of the project will typically not be relevant. CO2 storage in depleted gas fields does not 
create a lot of economic activity. The production location can easily be converted into a storage location 
Local benefits Local impact and risks
National (global) benefits 
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without much construction work. Also, the operation of the storage facility and monitoring activities will not be 
manpower-intensive. The storage location is fixed and equipment choices are limited and straightforward. 
Therefore participatory approaches (including stakeholders in design decisions) are only possible for a limited 
number of decisions (see c below). For the Barendrecht project we (and others) have tried to emphasize the 
importance of a CO2-infrastructure for the attractiveness of the Rijnmond region in the future. For energy-
intensive companies this may be a reason to invest in the area. The Barendrecht project includes an oversized 
pipeline that can be used in the future as part of a more extensive infrastructure. The pipeline will also enable an 
increase of the supply of CO2 to the greenhouses in the region. Although these benefits are more concrete, 
short-term and closer to home than ‘climate change’ we still found that they were not very important for the 
direct neighbors of the project.  
c. Local impact and risks: every activity or project that is carried out will have some certain impacts and some 
potential impacts (risks) on their direct environment. Because of the limited activities needed (see b) the certain 
impacts will be very limited. For the Barendrecht project this has been assessed and described in detail in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The EIA was reviewed by the independent committee for EIA’s; they 
concluded it was a thorough and fair assessment of all impacts and risks of the project. Basically, after 
construction of the pipeline and compressors, and work-over of the wells, people in Barendrecht will not notice 
much difference from when it was a gas production location. Also the safety risks are comparable to the safety 
risks of a gas production facility. Safety assessment and risk assessments have also been checked by the EIA 
Committee, by government agencies and by other experts. Experts agree risks are limited, within legal limits, 
and worst case scenarios have limited impact that can be managed by existing emergency response capabilities. 
Nevertheless, this is the issue that has been most important in the local debate as the perceived risks were much 
higher than the calculated risks. This can be explained as follows: 
- Risk perception theories identify certain risk characteristics that make a risk seem bigger than it actually is, 
and therefore make it less likely that people will be willing to accept that risk; a few of these characteristics 
apply (or people think they apply) to CO2-storage.  
- Local politicians and opponents have made repeated statements that if something would go wrong and there 
would be a leak that there could be a disaster.  
- There have been a number of scientists (usually not with specific expertise in the area of external safety) who 
have suggested that the safety calculations are not sound. 
Risk perception could benefit from a high level of participation, transparency and independent expertise for the 
development and execution of the monitoring plan. This will be set up with the help of CATO. 
 
In conclusion, the Local Value Proposition for most onshore storage projects will not be very strong. The benefits 
are mainly for others, somewhere else and later, and the (perceived) risks and impacts are here and now. In that 
situation it is very difficult to convince people that even small risks should be acceptable. As local people have said 
repeatedly: “why should I be in favor of this project”.  This dilemma can be addressed in different ways. In the 
densely populated Netherlands, where almost all infrastructure projects meet with local resistance the government 
has introduced  national coordination regulations that make it possible to take over some of the decision making 
powers of local authorities. This also applies for CO2 storage projects. This means that, as long as the project 
complies with all legislation and risks are therefore acceptable, only a very limited form of local acceptance is 
required. In places where project go-ahead depends (legally) on support from local authorities, and in cases where 
local support is perceived to be more important for other reasons, it will be necessary to improve the local value 
proposition by either increasing the local understanding of the national benefits and (probably more importantly) by 
creating some local benefits. See also Section 4. 
Good risk communication is very important, but unlikely to be sufficient for gaining local acceptance as CCS is a 
new (and controversial) topic and the technical details are too complicated for most people. This means that people 
will base their opinion on what they read and hear, and as Barendrecht has shown, a few scare stories can have a big 
impact. 
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4. Key Elements of a Public Acceptance Strategy 
After a thorough assessment of the Playing Field and the Local Value Proposition all the information is available 
to define an effective Public Acceptance strategy and plan. This is not the same as a project communications plan. 
The public acceptance strategy will often go far beyond what is in the power of the project team or the project’s 
team communications advisor to influence and achieve; especially when there are some serious areas of concern 
relating to the Playing Field or the Local Value Proposition.  
A good Public Acceptance Strategy is preferably developed with all stakeholders that want to see CCS 
implemented and that can or should contribute to the public debate.  
These parties have to agree on: 
a) Actions to improve the Playing Field (where needed) 
b) Actions to improve the Local Value Proposition (where needed) 
c) A high level communication plan (key messages, organization, roles, planning, participation, etc) 
As a company is rarely the most trusted source of information it is often preferable to let others (especially 
NGO’s and scientists) take the lead, if they want to, in communicating general information to the public. Based 
on this high-level plan it is then fairly straightforward to develop the company’s own communication plan.  
After agreeing a Public Acceptance Strategy in principle it is important to take a step back and consider what this 
means for the planning of the project. E.g. if numerous actions are needed to improve the playing field, or if one of 
the key players is not ready yet to engage others, then it may be better to delay the start of the project until these 
actions have been carried out and all key players are ready to participate. E.g. in case of the Barendrecht project, 
Shell probably should have waited until the government was ready to communicate. Instead a decision to proceed 
was made to meet the required early starting date in the tender.   
To give a flavor of what could be done as part of a Public Acceptance Plan just a few examples will be given 
below of what was and is being done on the Barendrecht project: 
- NAM BV (current operator of the Barendrecht fields) initiated and chaired the Steering Committee of the so-
called AMESCO study (a generic environmental impact assessment for CO2 storage in onshore gasfields). The EIA 
is a critical first step in Dutch permit procedures, and therefore it was deemed important to go through this process 
with all parties concerned before specific locations had been identified. The objective was to develop together more 
knowledge and understanding of the information available and critical aspects for an onshore storage EIA. 
- Shell Netherlands, together with the ministries involved, asked Energy Dialogue Netherlands (EDN) to organize 
engagement sessions to discuss with critical stakeholders their views on CCS. The objective was to get a better 
understanding on what the main concerns w.r.t. CCS were, and under what conditions stakeholders would support 
CCS. Interestingly it quickly became clear that there was broad consensus that safety was not an issue (with proper 
site selection and design) but that opinions were still divided on the need for CCS, the effectiveness of CCS, and the 
conditions under which CCS (and government funding of CCS) would be acceptable. 
- The national government, with support of Shell and other stakeholders, set up a local CO2 Information point in a 
local Barendrecht shopping mall in order to make it as easy as possible for people to obtain information, ask 
questions and give their opinion.  
- CO2 knowledge base: based on the research findings of the University of Leiden more general information on 
CCS was developed by a diverse group of stakeholders. The expectation is that with all these different parties 
agreeing the information is correct, balanced and complete, this also makes the information more trustworthy.       
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